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Abstract 
This essay explores the creation of the Metro-North Railroad in 1983 as a public agency 
to provide commuter train services on the New York–New Haven Line. The essay begins by 
bringing out the central role commuter rail services played in the negotiations over the New 
Haven Railroad’s bankruptcy in the 1960s. I argue that New Haven Line’s near liquidation 
during the bankruptcy prompted advocacy from commuters, urban planners, and politicians that 
pushed back against the trend towards automobile-centric urban transportation planning. In the 
next section, I use the New Haven Line’s subsequent operation in the 1970s under subsidy 
arrangements with another private railroad and a federally-run carrier to show that indirect 
subsidy did little to improve conditions since freight railroads—public or private—did not care 
about investing in commuter services, which did little to help their bottom line. Lastly, I argue 
that Metro-North succeeded in the 1980s at improving the railroad’s services because it effected 
the long overdue separation of commuter services from freight and intercity trains, which 
allowed for greater local control, customer-first management, and renegotiation of subsidies and 
labor rules. I go on to conclude that, despite its successes, the New Haven Line’s vital 
implication in interests ranging from the lives of individual commuters to the national economy 
has ironically hampered its progress as municipalities, the states of New York and Connecticut, 
and the federal government have failed to cooperate and adequately fund continued progress. 
 v 
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“I have always taken the position that the maintenance of essential commuter rail service 
is a governmental responsibility when private industry cannot perform this function. I now 
reiterate that belief,” testified Robert Wagner, Mayor of New York City, to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) in April 1965.1 Wagner’s statement accompanied those of New 
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and commuter representatives in a show of force against the 
bankrupt New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad (colloquially known as “the New 
Haven”). The railroad had applied to the ICC for permission to severely curtail commuter 
services along the New Haven Line in an effort to improve its finances. Governor Rockefeller 
had reminded the Commission the day before that “rail commutation in the New York 
metropolitan area is not a luxury but an absolute essential [sic] to the economic well-being of the 
City of New York, the nation’s business and commercial capital, and to the surrounding 
suburban areas.”2 
Rockefeller and Wagner’s testimonies and actions helped force the bankrupt railroad to 
temporarily keep the New Haven’s commuter line afloat. But could they save the New Haven 
Line? Would “governmental responsibility” step in to aid commuters where private industry did 
not? The New Haven Line presents an ideal case study for America’s big-city commuter 
railroads in the latter half of the twentieth century. Its story exposes the decline faced by these 
services in the hands of ailing private railroads that desperately wanted to exit the passenger 
                                                 
1 Robert F. Wagner, “Testimony in Relation to Proposed Discontinuances and Changes of Passenger Train Service 
Operated to and from New York City” (Interstate Commerce Commission, April 29, 1965), Box 44, New York, 
New Haven & Hartford Railroad Collection, Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research 
Center, University of Connecticut Libraries (“NHRR Archive”). 
2 Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Testimony in Relation to Proposed Discontinuances and Changes of Passenger Train 
Service Operated to and from New York City” (Interstate Commerce Commission, April 28, 1965), 2, Box 44, 
NHRR Archive. 
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business, and the ways in which the federal government and the states ultimately provided more 
direct subsidies to keep them alive. The eventual creation of Metro-North (a division of New 
York State’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority) to run the New Haven Line represented a 
seizure of control both from the federal government, which had provided poor service running 
the line during the 1970s, and the private sector, which had sought to discontinue commuter 
service altogether and deferred maintenance to disastrous effect in the 1960s and before. Metro-
North’s joint service of two states has brought out the challenges of coordinating regional 
interests between states under American federalism. 
American commuter rail is heavily under-studied. There are no books that focus on 
American commuter rail in the latter half of the 20th century. All the major railroads in the 1960s 
thought of themselves as freight carriers saddled with a government obligation to carry 
passengers, and railroad scholarship generally reflects this emphasis on freight. Even among 
works focused on passenger transportation, commuter rail often merits little more than a passing 
mention, as it carries neither the romance and tragedy of the decline of intercity trains nor the 
erstwhile urban relevance—even to tourists—and iconic status of better-known public transit 
systems like subways and buses. Commuter rail service was traditionally provided by many of 
the same railroads that ran intercity services, with the New Haven Railroad as a prime example. 
One of the achievements won in the creation of Metro-North and similar systems around the 
country was recognition of commuter rail’s greater kinship with municipal public transit than 
with intercity travel, allowing it to receive higher levels of subsidy, share operations with other 
transit under a central commuter authority, and focus on the experiences and desires of riders 
without the threat of stripping back service in pursuit of profit. 
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In this paper, I will argue that the plight of the New Haven railroad and its thousands of 
daily passengers helped bring about a shift in mindset among policymakers and taxpayers about 
the nature and necessity of railroad commuting. Private railroads hamstrung by outmoded 
antitrust regulation sought to axe essential public services in a drive for financial gain. The real 
threat of canceled service prompted the public to take on the burden of operating commuter rail 
in the name of the benefits it provided the city as an alternative to destructive and wildly 
expensive automobile infrastructure and the unpalatable prospect of sitting in traffic. Nascent 
environmental concerns also played into the public’s valuation of rail commutation, at first in the 
name of curbing pollution and then, in the 1970s, as an economical response to the energy crises. 
By creating the Metro-North, the states of New York and Connecticut acknowledged the reality 
that commuter rail service held much more in common with urban mass transportation like buses 
and subways than it did with freight trains and followed the example of the local public takeover 
of these services that had taken place across U.S. cities earlier in the 20th century. That the 
Metro-North has experienced such a dramatic turnaround reflects the motivation of local 
governments to keep up and improve essential public services like transportation for the larger 
benefits they provide for quality of life and the regional economy, even if commuter rail itself is 
not directly profitable.  
 
The more than twenty-year process that led from the 1961 bankruptcy of the New Haven 
to the 1983 creation of the Metro-North proved excruciating for riders. The New Haven Line was 
passed first from the New Haven Railroad to Penn Central in a 1968 merger of northeastern 
railroads and then to Conrail, a federal carrier Congress created to take over from the bankrupt 
Penn Central in 1976. The New Haven and Penn Central deferred essential maintenance on 
passenger equipment, hoping both to save money and discourage ridership and to prove to the 
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Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that these lines were unnecessary and eligible for 
termination.3 Notices announcing that commuter service would be canceled entirely and 
imminently (pending court approval, which never came) were posted multiple times in stations 
along the line, forcing riders to plan alternate ways to get to and from Manhattan. In 1980, fewer 
than three quarters of trains were on time.4 As such, the takeover of the Conrail commuter lines 
by the MTA was met with cautious optimism: a New York Times editorial to “welcome” the 
railroad mused that “having no freight division, it may be better able to remember that its cargo 
is people.”5 
The preservation of the New Haven Line aimed to preserve a way of life—and an 
economic lifeline. New York’s density and economic prosperity had climbed steadily since the 
line first served wealthy suburban commuters in the 1800s. Many of Manhattan’s professionals 
continued to live in Westchester and Fairfield Counties to raise families away from the bustle of 
the city. Though these families probably all owned private automobiles by the 1960s, commuters 
continued to rely on rail travel to bypass automobile traffic, make use of the ride to read a 
newspaper or catch up on work, and avoid the hassle and expense of parking in New York City. 
Academic and think tank studies from the 1960s repeatedly emphasized what was at stake in 
saving suburban rail transit: eliminating commuter trains would require constructing impossibly 
large expressways and new parking garages that would cost well more than subsidizing rail 
service. Additional automobile infrastructure would also be a blight on the city and the suburbs 
                                                 
3 William D. Middleton, “How Metro-North Did It: From Faltering to First Rate in a Decade,” in North American 
Commuter Rail 1994 (Pasadena, CA: Pentrex, 1994), 8. 
4 Christopher T. Baer, “A General Chronology of the Successors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and Their 
Historical Context, 1980–1989” (Pennsylvania Railroad Technical and Historical Society, April 2015), 1, 
http://www.prrths.com/newprr_files/Hagley/PRR1980.pdf. 
5 New York Times Editorial Board, “New Neighbors, New Management: Railroad Switch,” New York Times, 
January 4, 1983. 
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and increase air pollution.6 The ICC and state policymakers pushing subsidies for commuter rail 
would cite such regional planning thinking as they sought to establish the public interest in 
perpetuating commuter rail service alongside other urban mass transit. While private railroads 
sought to eliminate all passenger service in a perennial effort to turn a profit, the ICC and state 
subsidy efforts prevented the death of commuter rail on the New Haven Line. 
Saving commuter rail was not a foregone conclusion. One needs only to look at the 
streetcar, an immensely popular form of public transportation in the early 20th century which was 
completely removed by local authorities across the country by the end of the 1960s. Automobile 
interests and many planners promoted diesel buses, which integrated more easily with car traffic 
on both urban streets and highways and were cheaper to maintain than streetcars and their tracks, 
which by that point seemed like relics of a bygone era.7 Postwar low-density suburban housing, 
subsidized by the government, was designed with the automobile in mind, sprawling out in a 
manner difficult to serve with linear transit.8 While New York’s subway was guaranteed a future 
through public ownership under the stewardship of Mayor Fiorello La Guardia in 1940, 
privately-owned streetcar lines were left to founder as the United States embraced its automotive 
future.9 
In the end, political inertia seems to have played a role in the continuance of the New 
Haven Line. Commuters were adamant about the necessity of train service, but New York and 
Connecticut never leaped at the opportunity to run it and took it over only when the Reagan 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Leonard Lund, “The Commuter Problem in the New York Area: A Consideration of Past Efforts 
and a Proposed Solution for the Present Problem” (New York University, 1962). 
7 Brian Ladd, Autophobia: Love and Hate in the Automotive Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 132. 
It didn’t help that private transit companies that ran streetcar lines were viewed as predatory land speculators, 
making individual automobile ownership seem liberating by comparison. 
8 Mark S. Foster, From Streetcar to Superhighway: American City Planners and Urban Transportation, 1900-1940, 
Technology and Urban Growth (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 178–9. 
9 Taras Grescoe, Straphanger: Saving Our Cities and Ourselves from the Automobile (New York: Times Books, 
2012), 58. 
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administration mandated that the states relieve Conrail of its beleaguered commuter services. 
The MTA gained increasing control over the New Haven Line as it began to administer subsidies 
and coordinate operations in the 1970s. Though the gradual nature of the transition from private 
to public ownership beleaguered riders, it allowed the agency to gain experience with commuter 
rail operations such that the final handover in 1983 was relatively smooth. 
In its first ten years, the Metro-North garnered respect for its improved on-time 
performance and equipment. Ridership also jumped 20% from the Conrail days by 1990.10 By 
2013, the railroad had fully doubled its ridership and received an international prize for railroad 
design.11 I attribute this turnaround to the railroad’s state control under the MTA, which brought 
customer-oriented, experienced management to the former Conrail lines. With the railroad no 
longer in private hands, New York and Connecticut were directly responsible for the quality of 
operations, and through Metro-North they collectively undertook a series of modernization 
efforts and innovative approaches to expanding service that would have been impossible to 
imagine under the freight railroads, which were not interested in investing capital in an operation 
that seemed hopelessly unprofitable. 
Despite these strides, the New Haven Line’s difficulties both before and after its takeover 
by Metro-North illuminate struggles with metropolitan regional transportation policy in the 
United States. The federal government has retained a hands-off approach to commuter rail since 
the Reagan Era despite its interstate nature and consequences for the national economy.12 The 
New Haven Line’s joint service to New York and Connecticut has resulted in a lack of funding 
                                                 
10 “A New President For Metro-North,” The New York Times, April 5, 1991, sec. N.Y. / Region, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/05/nyregion/metro-datelines-a-new-president-for-metro-north.html. 
11 MTA, “MTA Metro-North Railroad Turns 30 Today: From Worst to Best in Three Decades,” January 1, 2013, 
http://www.mta.info/press-release/metro-north/mta-metro-north-railroad-turns-30-today. 
12 Federal interaction with Metro-North today mostly takes the form of conflicts between it and Amtrak over funding 
improvements and managing operations on the New Haven Line, with overlaps with Amtrak’s marquee Northeast 
Corridor service between Washington, DC and Boston. 
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as policymakers in each state point to the other as underpaying. Although the railroad’s operation 
centers on New York City, the city itself plays a minimal role in funding and operating the 
railroad. I place responsibility for Metro-North’s web of insufficient subsidies on the collective 
action problem posed by American federalism. Metro-North’s huge range of stakeholders 
ranging from the local to the federal has begotten perennial finger-pointing leading to stagnation. 
While the states’ formation of a public agency to run the New Haven Line was a step in the right 
direction, the federal government and the states Metro-North serves have failed to provide 
unified policy towards and sufficient support for essential commuter rail service for one of our 
nation’s largest metropolises. 
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The Death of the New Haven and the Birth of Penn Central 
Eastern Railroads and the Commuter Problem 
Railroad commuting, which allowed bankers, lawyers, and other upper- and upper-
middle-class professionals to reside in the suburbs while working day jobs downtown, spurred 
the concurrent growth of Manhattan into a uniquely dense American economic nerve center and 
the development of affluent residential communities in Westchester and Fairfield Counties. In 
the 1960s, this way of life—which had close parallels in a few of the United States’ largest 
cities—came under threat as the New Haven entered into bankruptcy, due in part to the losses it 
incurred providing commuter service.13 While railroads such as the New Haven would cite the 
obligation of providing passenger services as a principal reason for their financial insolvency, the 
reality was that competition from new technologies challenged both the freight and passenger 
businesses in the prosperous postwar years. Furthermore, the New Haven and other railroads 
were fond of lumping commuter and intercity trains together in their cost accounting, a practice 
which belied the vast differences between the two and nearly brought the end of essential 
commuter rail service to New York as the New Haven sought to erase its passenger deficit. 
While American railroads enjoyed heavy traffic during World War II, postwar investment 
in motor vehicle and aviation infrastructure threatened all forms of railroad business. During 
World War II, American railroads thrived. Passenger ridership soared due to gasoline 
restrictions, and freight use exploded with the intense demands of the industry. Heavy railroad 
utilization during the war took a heavy toll on railroad equipment and physical plant as 
                                                 
13 In the largest U.S. cities, a wide range of major railroads provided commuter service on their lines. For example, 
New York City was served by the New Haven Railroad from Connecticut, the New York Central Railroad from 
Westchester, the Long Island Railroad, and the Pennsylvania and Erie Lackawanna Railroads from New Jersey. 
Boston was served by the Boston and Maine Railroad from the north, the New York Central from the west, and the 
New Haven from the south. Philadelphia was served by the Pennsylvania and Reading railroads. Chicago was 
served by the Alton, Burlington Northern, Chicago and North Western, Illinois Central, Milwaukee, Norfolk and 
Western, and Rock Island railroads, among others.  
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maintenance was deferred until peacetime.14 Unfortunately for the railroads, the postwar years 
brought a steady decline in both freight and passenger miles despite the United States’ economic 
prosperity as millions of Americans with disposable incomes pursued the dream of car-
dependent home ownership in auto-centric, sprawling suburbia. Long-distance passenger trains, 
once the pinnacle of domestic luxury travel, were gradually supplanted by increasingly safe, fast, 
and affordable (thanks to government subsidy) air traffic and automobile road trips.15 Truckers 
simultaneously poached shipping from the railroads as states and the federal government built 
out the national road network. President Eisenhower’s 1956 National Interstate and Defense 
Highways Act, which provided a 90% federal subsidy for states to build out a network of grade-
separated, limited access highways ideal for high-speed automobile travel, accelerated the 
diversion of freight traffic to truckers (who now could boast delivery times comparable to the 
railroads, even over long distances) and intercity and commuter travel to private cars (which 
provided convenient, expedient door-to-door service).16 
The railroads hit hardest by the changing economics of transportation were the eastern 
carriers. Western long-haul railroads like the Union Pacific benefitted from superior speed and 
lower cost achieved over long distances. They also carried mostly raw materials and foodstuffs 
that were well-suited to the heavy haul capacities of freight trains. Lastly, western and southern 
railroads could serve emerging markets in the Sun Belt.17 Eastern railroads operated on a raw 
                                                 
14 Maury Klein, Unfinished Business: The Railroad in American Life (Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
England, 1994), 160. 
15 Richard Saunders, Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900-1970 (DeKalb, Ill: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2001), 106–8, provides a concise summary of the ways the government subsidized auto and air travel in the 
postwar years. 
16 Donald M. Itzkoff, Off the Track: The Decline of the Intercity Passenger Train in the United States, Contributions 
in Economics and Economic History 62 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 28–9; see also Ladd, Autophobia, 
100. 
17 Robert B. Carson, Main Line to Oblivion: The Disintegration of New York Railroads in the Twentieth Century, 
National University Publications: Series in American Studies (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), 151–2. 
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materials-in, finished goods-out model that was becoming increasingly outmoded as 
manufacturing declined in cities like New Haven after the war. Whatever freight service that was 
left for them to provide was highly susceptible to truck competition due to the shorter distances 
involved. 
The New Haven was a symptomatic eastern railroad, and its high commuter volume 
prompted it to look past its declining freight revenues to blame passengers, and commuters in 
particular, for its financial woes. The New Haven and the Long Island Railroad carried the 
highest proportions of passenger to freight traffic in the nation, with a large volume of 
commuters. Commuters, so-called for the “commuted” prices they paid on their monthly tickets, 
were in some ways a particular financial drain for the railroad.18 They concentrated heavy 
passenger traffic into approximately four hours of the day, requiring tight timetables and many 
trains to accommodate weekday rushes to and from the city. For the rest of the day, a large 
portion of the equipment and the people that ran it sat idle. Nevertheless, the railroads hired 
commuter conductors for full days of work, meaning that they were paid for eight hours, plus 
four of overtime, despite working on trains for just four.19 Similarly, commuter trains either had 
to be stored in Grand Central Terminal, where storage capacity was extraordinarily expensive, or 
“deadheaded” (moved without customers) to a more spacious suburban yard. Thus the low 
                                                 
18 The degree to which commuter trains were a financial drain was subject to a fair amount of debate. The railroads 
over-exaggerated the deficit incurred in providing the service, while some commuter rail advocates and 
policymakers went as far as to argue that commuter rail in fact posed no deficit whatsoever. See James C. Nelson, 
Railroad Transportation and Public Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1959), 284–9, 309–13, for a 
discussion of how railroads and the ICC estimated the financial burden of passenger service given the many 
overlapping costs with freight service. In stark contrast to the New Haven’s claims of heavy deficits incurred by 
commuter service, Governor Rockefeller argued in his 1965 court appearance that expert witnesses showed that 
those services “operated at or near the break even point” (Rockefeller, “Testimony in Relation to Proposed 
Discontinuances,” 3). 
19 George W. Hilton, “The Decline of Railroad Commutation,” Business History Review 36, no. 2 (1962): 174, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3111454. 
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utilization of equipment, which represented a fixed capital cost for the railroad, contributed to a 
high expense ratio for operating commuter rail.20  
Commuter rail was also subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC), which had controlled rates and services for railroad freight since its establishment in 
1887. Congress gave the ICC control over passenger services in 1958 to provide a mechanism 
for railroads to drop highly under-used and unprofitable branch lines, which local politicians had 
forced them to preserve. The ICC evaluated these abandonments on a case-by-case basis and 
granted them if they determined that they were “not required by public convenience or necessity 
and were therefore a burden on interstate commerce.”21 The ICC’s rate controls meant that the 
New Haven and other suburban railroads could not easily raise fares on commuters. As a result, 
the financial deficit of operating commuter rail deepened.22 By preventing large-scale service 
abandonments and fare hikes, the ICC’s regulation constrained the railroads from streamlining 
their services in response to increased competition in the postwar era. As a result, the fiscal woes 
of Eastern railroads like the New Haven quickly multiplied, and they could do little to cut back 
in response. The ICC presciently treated commuter rail as a public service worthy of protection. 
But government, federal and local, had so far failed to provide accompanying public funds in 
recognition of the ICC’s approach, which caused the railroads to under-invest in, and attempt to 
cancel, commuter rail service in pursuit of financial stability. 
                                                 
20 J. W. Swanberg, North American Commuter Rail 1994: Including a Detailed User’s Guide for Every System in 
the U.S. and Canada, ed. William D. Middleton (Pasadena, CA: Pentrex, 1994), 2. 
21 Saunders, Merging Lines, 245. 
22 Lawrence Grow, On the 8:02: An Informal History of Commuting by Rail in America (New York: Mayflower 
Books, 1979), 17. Despite the perennial protestations of commuters over fares, the price per mile of commuter 
service actually fell from 2.5 cents at the beginning of the century to 1 cent in 1930. Grow reminds us that “whether 
it was known or not, even the broken-down service of the postwar period was a true bargain.” 
 13 
Planners’ Responses to Commuter Deficits 
Urban planners grappling with the implications of the automobile on urban transportation 
in the 1960s backed up the ICC’s conviction that commuter rail was an essential regional service, 
which helped convince the governments of New York and Connecticut to take steps toward 
public funding and control of commuter rail. Planners coupled the vivid imagery of downtown 
destruction for parking lots and freeways with studies on the economic and logistical 
impracticalities of transporting Manhattan’s huge commuter population by motor vehicle to 
convince policymakers that saving commuter rail was in the public interest. 
Planners persuasively argued that a wholesale shift to automobile commuting 
infrastructure would be prohibitively expensive and disastrous to New York’s built environment. 
In 1961, the Regional Plan Association (RPA) prepared a report for the Senate Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee that outlined the crisis of commuter transportation in New York 
City’s Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York suburbs. In its recommendations, the RPA noted 
that half of the 400,000 people working in New York’s central business district took commuter 
rail to work and argued that the cost to transition these commuters to automobiles and buses 
would be “enormous.” State and local governments would have to build new expressways and 
bridges, handle increased downtown traffic, and repurpose high-value land for parking.23 The 
RPA boiled the commuter railroads’ problems down to the poor condition of equipment and 
troubled finances, which it attributed to a cycle of reduced ridership and corresponding 
insufficient maintenance due to reduced revenues. Both the RPA and a 1962 report in Business 
                                                 
23 “Commuter Transportation: A Study of Passenger Transportation in the New Jersey-New York-Connecticut 
Metropolitan Region with Particular Reference to Railroad Commutation,” Prepared for the Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce of the United States Senate (Regional Plan Association, January 31, 1961), 3–4. 
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History Review by University of California, Berkley business professor George Hilton noted that 
most of the reduction in ridership that began this cycle occurred in the off-peak periods: 
The rise of suburban shopping centers has drastically altered habits of suburban 
housewives, whose trips to the downtown area for shopping were once the 
principal source of off-hour revenue for commuter trains. Similarly, television 
reduced ridership in evening hours by removing much of the theater traffic. 
Adoption of the five-day week in the postwar period cost the railroads one day's 
commuter traffic.24 
The RPA and Hilton differed on how the federal government should respond to the 
commuter rail crisis. The RPA emphasized Manhattan’s role as the “nerve center of the nation’s 
economy,” the federal government’s status as one of the region’s largest employers, and public 
safety concerns as reasons that the federal government should provide capital funds to 
rehabilitate and buy new commuter rail equipment and facilities, fund equipment research, and 
repeal the federal passenger fares tax.25 The RPA did not suggest that Congress subsidize any 
continuing losses from commuter rail service after its emergency modernization, and instead 
suggested that state and local budgets take up this burden, as well as cancel property taxes on 
commuter railroads, in exchange for the responsibility to set service standards and locations.26 
Though downplayed by the RPA in its emphasis on the possibilities created by system 
modernization, even the best-kept commuter railroads could not turn a profit, and the states 
would inevitably be required to cover what had become substantial operating deficits. 
 In his analysis, Hilton diverged from the RPA’s preservationist approach and argued that 
commuter rail was destined to die and should not be subsidized. He saw the contribution of 
automotive traffic to downtown congestion as an argument to embrace urban sprawl and 
                                                 
24 Hilton, “The Decline of Railroad Commutation,” 173–4. 
25 “Commuter Transportation,” 6–7. 
26 “Commuter Transportation,” 7. By arguing for federal capital grants instead of continuing subsidies, the RPA 
played to Congress’s distaste for nationalization and mirrored the recently approved Highway Act of 1956. 
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decentralization, rather than propping up the outmoded radial commuter model. “The city of the 
future,” he wrote, “is likely to have the general characteristics of Los Angeles: an atrophied 
center, identifiable but no longer of great significance, surrounded by a great admixture of 
residential, manufacturing, and commercial areas.”27 Though Hilton’s view fit with the popular 
conception at the time that railroads were a transportation mode of the past to be supplanted by 
cars and may have been well-suited to midwestern and western cities like Los Angeles, it did not 
accommodate eastern metropolises like New York, which were already heavily urbanized and 
had little room for expansion. As the RPA convincingly argued, the federal government could 
not simply stand by and let New York “atrophy” at the hand of traffic congestion were the 
commuter railroads to cease their service. Planners repositioned commuter rail as an essential 
and cost-effective municipal transportation service rather than an outdated technology, which 
provided politically advantageous economic justifications for public subsidies to perpetuate 
commuter rail. 
The New Haven Goes Bankrupt 
By the 1960s, the New Haven was in dire financial circumstances, and commuter 
services bore the brunt of its troubles. Since the war its commuter trains had gained a reputation 
for being “notoriously cold, dirty, and late,” which certainly did not help attract additional 
passengers.28 The railroad was hit hard by a hurricane and flooding in 1955, which exacerbated 
equipment problems and the maintenance deficit. The New Haven’s bankruptcy became all but 
assured with the construction of the Connecticut Turnpike, today Interstate 95, which paralleled 
                                                 
27 Hilton, “The Decline of Railroad Commutation,” 186–7. 
28 Saunders, Merging Lines, 247. 
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the route of the railroad and drew away both passenger and freight traffic. The earlier Merritt 
Parkway, which followed a parallel route inland, did not permit commercial traffic.29  
The New Haven’s bankruptcy in 1961 forced the states to decide whether commuter rail 
was worth saving. The railroad’s new court-appointed trustees, realizing they had inherited a 
doomed railroad, quickly pivoted to three measures to bring solvency: maximization of state and 
federal assistance in the short-term, discontinuance of unprofitable passenger service to any 
extent possible, and inclusion in the slowly germinating merger of the two largest eastern 
railroads, the Pennsylvania and its archrival, the New York Central.  
As early as 1960, the railroad had reported to the ICC that passenger service deficits were 
the cause of its financial woes. In a petition to the Commission to request approval for a 
passenger fare increase, the New Haven argued that its “lavish taxation,” as compared to the 
“vast subsidies” issued by the federal government for highway and airport facilities, had 
increased the competition for long-distance travel and accordingly reduced its customer base, 
necessitating the requested fare hike.30 Interestingly, despite its knowledge of the heavy deficits 
associated specifically with commuting and its imminent requests to discontinue all passenger 
service, the New Haven itself laid out the case for the preservation of commuter services, much 
in the same way the RPA would in its report a year later: 
Commuter service by rail is also essential because the abandonment of such 
service would result in chaotic traffic congestion in the metropolitan areas and 
any attempt to substitute adequate highways to provide for the transportation of 
the rail commuters would run into astronomical figures.31 
                                                 
29 John L. Weller, The New Haven Railroad: Its Rise and Fall (New York: Hastings House, 1969), 222. Ironically, 
the railroad saw a windfall from hauling materials to aid the construction of the highway that would hasten its 
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30 New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., “Plan Regarding Future Operation of the New Haven Railroad 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission,” August 22, 1960, 1, Box 35, NHRR Archive. 
31 New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 2–3. 
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This statement may have been an effort by the railroad to appear reasonable to policymakers and 
regulators evaluating the possibility of alleviating the New Haven of its commuter service 
burden. Even so, the New Haven’s advocacy for the continuance of commuter trains by another 
entity despite its interest in their cancellation is indicative of the degree to which alternatives 
such as highway service did not appear realistic to those intimately familiar with the heavy 
traffic managed by commuter rail. 
Residents of Connecticut and New York dependent on the line realized that the New 
Haven’s bankruptcy put commuter services in jeopardy and spoke out for the preservation of the 
New Haven Line. In a hearing at the U.S. District Court of Connecticut, which presided over the 
New Haven’s reorganization proceedings, trustee Richard Joyce Smith expressed the railroad’s 
intention to discontinue passenger service absent public support.32 Herbert Baldwin, First 
Selectman of Westport, spoke in favor of the provision of such funds, noting that a third of 
Westport’s 20,000 residents relied on service to New York City for their livelihoods. Calling the 
prospect of discontinuation “catastrophic” to Westport with a “similar situation” in other 
Fairfield County towns, Baldwin argued that disrupting passenger service on the New Haven 
“would have a serious effect upon the economy of the entire state.”33 Baldwin’s testimony 
showed the degree to which New Haven riders viewed its service as the only viable way to 
commute to New York, and his broad-reaching economic arguments illuminated the municipal 
and regional stakes of curtailing train service. 
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Despite advocacy from both the railroad’s trustees and the riders themselves for 
government assistance to perpetuate commuter service, the states were slow to act. The 
Connecticut legislature created the Connecticut Transportation Authority (CTA) in 1963 to 
administer subsidies to the New Haven, but New York dragged its feet.34 Meanwhile, the federal 
government refused to consider contributing to subsidizing the New Haven’s commuter service 
until the states each made substantial contributions.35 Though New York and Connecticut would 
eventually agree in 1965 to jointly fund commuter service in 1965, the four years of circular 
finger-pointing prompted the New Haven to take direct action to cancel commuter service. 
In February 1965, the trustees notified the ICC of its desire to discontinue all passenger 
service. The government was in a bind, because the courts that presided over the bankruptcy 
reorganization proceedings could not compel the railroad to continue to operate a money-losing 
service, given the company’s obligations to its shareholders. At the same time, the ICC alongside 
local and state authorities strongly opposed passenger discontinuance except in the cases of 
particularly underutilized branch lines that were deemed outside of the public necessity. In a 
decision of the District Court of Connecticut on February 15, Judge Robert Anderson affirmed 
that the New Haven ought to be allowed to make such a request, writing that the evidence in 
favor of pursuing discontinuance was “devastating and overwhelming. It stands completely 
uncontradicted.”36 Anderson made the case that although the New Haven’s status as a public 
                                                 
34 Lloyd Almirall, an attorney for the New Haven’s bondholders, argued that “discouraging and disastrous as it may 
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Haven, and Hartford Railroad Company, debtor: Memorandum of decision re petition for Order No. 287, No. 30226 
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utility meant that the public interest weighed in considering its continued operation, court 
precedent established firmly that the public interest (in favor of continued passenger service) 
must be balanced against a fiduciary duty to shareholders and creditors: 
There are strict limits to the extent to which, in reorganization proceedings, the 
interests of creditors… may be sacrificed to the public interest; to exceed those 
limits is (to say the least) to come dangerously close to the edge of 
unconstitutional taking of property, a line from which courts should keep away if 
possible.37 
Anderson went on to condemn the states for the insufficient stopgap measures they had taken up 
to that point and emphatically declared that they were drawing “the last ounces of blood out of 
this near corpse” by continuing to tax the New Haven.38 In light of the intense competition for 
traffic from air, water, and road transportation and the lackadaisical response of the relevant 
states, Judge Anderson saw no choice but to allow the railroad to move ahead with its request to 
eliminate passenger service. Congressional representatives, who neither wished to see the 
crippling congestion and associated economic consequences forecasted in the event of 
discontinuance, nor face angry constituents, found themselves in a bind. 
The New Haven’s plan to discontinue passenger service prompted studies of the potential 
consequences by urban planners in the region it served. These studies built on general regional 
planning literature such as that of the RPA and galvanized the federal and state interventions to 
preserve the New Haven’s commuter services. The Southwestern Regional Planning Agency, 
based in Norwalk, CT, produced a study in 1965 surveying the plans made by Fairfield County 
residents for alternatives to commuting by rail. Thirty-five percent of respondents indicated that 
they would move out of the region entirely rather than endure highway traffic, indicating that the 
                                                 
37 Frank, Jerome, In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1952), quoted in Anderson, 
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death of the commuter line would be a serious economic and social blow for Fairfield County.39 
Such commuter agitation was instrumental in motivating political activism against the New 
Haven’s plan. The ICC would cite both sources of opposition when it denied the New Haven’s 
discontinuance petition the next year. 
M-Day: The ICC Mandates Commuter Service 
The ICC decided the New Haven’s passenger discontinuance case on April 5,1966, 
preventing an all-out abandonment of service and fully preserving commuter runs.40 The 
decision was issued jointly with the commission’s approval of the proposed Pennsylvania–New 
York Central merger, which was conditioned on the inclusion of the New Haven. Despite the 
protests of the two large railroads, the newly formed Penn Central would not be allowed to 
abandon the New Haven’s passenger services. The implications of the April 27 announcement of 
this joint decision earned it the nickname “M-Day” (merger day) and set the stage for the biggest 
merger in the history of American railroading.41 
In the decision, Vice Chairman William Tucker pointed out the railroads’ concerted 
efforts to modernize freight service to keep up with competition from other modes, which he 
contrasted with their reaction to competition for passengers: 
Railroads in general seem at times to have aided and abetted in the decline of their 
effectiveness as passenger carriers by permitting discomfort, delay, 
undependability, poor scheduling, discourtesy, obsolete equipment, inadequate 
space, insufficient facilities, and other disabilities for which railroad passenger 
service has become increasingly notorious.42 
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This damning critique of the railroads’ neglect of passenger service, exhibited one of the core 
sources of contempt among officials for the railroads’ incessant complaints about providing 
public transportation. While railroads could have doubled down on passenger service in the 
1940s and fifties by expanding marketing, investing in equipment maintenance, or exploring new 
fare systems, they instead allowed it to atrophy with the hope of reducing demand to the point of 
its eventual self-determining elimination.43 
The ICC’s decision flatly rejected the argument, raised by Hilton and partially by the 
railroads, that car, bus, and air transportation could completely replace passenger trains. 
Importantly, the ICC affirmed the essential distinction between intercity service—which could 
be supplanted to some extent by motor vehicles and airplanes—and commuting, in which the 
railroads played an indispensable role. The Commission acknowledged that peak-period 
commutation in particular would greatly increase congestion, pollution, and traffic deaths, and 
argued that “the answer to this nation’s existing and anticipated surface travel problems is not to 
be found in a continued over-reliance on highways.”44 Tucker cited several sources for this 
position, the first being a wealth of support from citizens and their representatives, and 
demonstrated willingness by the states concerned to subsidize service.45 From a federal 
perspective, the ICC pointed to recently passed legislation calling for the Secretary of Commerce 
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to research the possibility of high-speed passenger rail as evidence for government support for 
passenger rail service.46 
The powerful voices of Westchester and Fairfield County commuters made an impression 
on the ICC and lent a human touch to regulatory hearings that otherwise were often decided on 
dry economic terms.47 Tucker wrote that car and bus substitution for rail traffic into New York 
City would be “completely inadequate, entailing much personal inconvenience and travel over 
circuitous routes for extended times and extra distances.”48 He went on to emphasize the 
economic impact that such a measure would take on the region and even the nation, citing the 
high incomes of suburbanites along the line and their correspondingly expensive homes that they 
might abandon in the case of discontinued rail service. Testimony from commuters helped 
establish the immense public inconvenience that discontinuing service would cause. Thus, 
despite the presumed ability of Westchester and Fairfield commuters to afford the switch to auto 
commuting, the ICC drew on the immense public expense required to accommodate such an 
influx of traffic and the deleterious effects on income levels and the real estate markets in these 
counties to justify the necessity of continued commuter service on the New Haven Line. 
In effect, the ICC’s decision put the ball back in the states’ court to find an effective and 
efficient plan to permanently subsidize commuter services. It validated many of the arguments 
for commuter rail, which at this point had been hashed out endlessly, while also making clear 
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that its decision to force the New Haven to continue its service (under the coming banner of Penn 
Central) was predicated on the absorption of commuter deficits by the states involved. The ICC 
decision would inspire New York and Connecticut to create the appropriate agencies to 
administer (and eventually take over) commuter service, so that the states could seek any 
available federal funds for shoring up the line and to provide oversight to ensure quality of 
service and efficiency of operation. Unlike in later years, commuters and policymakers barely 
raised energy use and pollution reduction justifications for commuter rail in the discussions 
surrounding the New Haven’s bankruptcy; instead, rail advocates focused primarily on the 
negative economic and spatial side effects of highway commutation. But how would New York 
and Connecticut go about preserving commuter rail? The states faced a decision over whether to 
subsidize private operation or create a new agency to operate the New Haven’s commuter 
services.   
Governor Rockefeller and the Formation of the MTA 
The states responded to the dire situation of the New Haven with a subsidy established 
under the aegis of the newly-formed Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA). 
The MCTA had been created by the New York legislature in 1965 as part of its plan to buy the 
Long Island Railroad (LIRR) from the Pennsylvania Railroad, which had been operating under 
bankruptcy protection since 1949. A nearly exclusively passenger railroad that at the time was 
the most heavily-used commuter carrier in the nation, the Long Island was in severe condition.49 
The MCTA, the brainchild of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s transportation advisor, 
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William Ronan, was intended to rejuvenate the LIRR by harnessing federal as well as state and 
local funding sources.50 
The MCTA was created with New York’s other commuter railroads in mind as well, and 
the Rockefeller administration took steps to expand its purview. In 1965, after the New Haven’s 
clash with the ICC, the governors of New York and Connecticut—Rockefeller and his 
counterpart, John Dempsey—agreed to subsidize service on the New Haven Line under an even 
50–50 split.51 The subsidy would be paid to the New Haven and its successors to cover the costs 
of providing service. Without this agreement, the New Haven would have discontinued its 
commuter services; this was the point in the New Haven Line’s history where the threat of 
liquidation was most real and imminent.52  
In an effort to seek a longer-term solution to the New Haven’s passenger woes, the 
subsidy program hinged on a “federal mass transportation demonstration project” managed by 
the Tri-State Transportation Committee (TSTC), chaired by William Ronan, and funded by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development under the recent Urban Mass Transportation 
Act of 1964.53 The project provided a two-thirds federal subsidy for the line’s deficits (with the 
states covering the remaining third) and called for a range of studies on improving various 
aspects of commuter service. In its initial report, the TSTC raised the possibility of following the 
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example of the LIRR and purchasing the line outright, although it posited this approach as 
“complicated” due to the New Haven’s status “as an interstate, long-distance carrier as well as a 
commuter line.”54 Nearly twenty years before the founding of Metro-North, William Ronan’s 
TSTC identified what would become the New Haven Line’s greatest challenge: coordinating the 
interests of and funding from two state governments.  
Heeding the advice of the TSTC, the New York legislature stopped short of including a 
takeover of the New Haven Line in its massive 1968 expansion of the MCTA to form the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA).55 Under the chairmanship of William Ronan, the 
MTA gained responsibility for overseeing operations on New York City’s northern commuter 
lines (including the newly-subsidized New Haven Line), which would shortly be included in the 
Penn Central merger. The formation of the MTA represented the second step in the progression 
towards public ownership that began with the establishment of a subsidy in 1965. 
In its final act, the MCTA prepared a “Program for Action,” delivered to Rockefeller, that 
laid out a plan for the new MTA and called for extensive capital investment in all areas of New 
York City’s rail services. This document was a seminal work of regional transportation planning 
for the New York metropolitan area, and it marked the beginning of a slow process of tangible 
modernization on the New Haven Line. Now that the New Haven Line was under state 
supervision, the MTA could make an effort to amass city, state, and federal funds—and initiate 
cooperation with the Connecticut Department of Transportation (CDOT)—to implement such 
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improvements as buying new, air-conditioned cars, installing high-level platforms at stations, 
rehabilitating tracks, and maintaining the electric power delivery system.56  
Despite the glimmer of hope offered by the quickly-moving consolidation of New York’s 
transportation infrastructure in the MTA under Governor Rockefeller, the states’ unwillingness 
to purchase the entire New Haven commuter railroad outright ensured that progress would 
remain limited for the next decade. While the MTA, with cooperation from Connecticut, 
succeeded in advancing state funds and applying for federal grants for some capital 
improvements, the freight railroads (first Penn Central, then Conrail) that provided day-to-day 
operations continued to de-prioritize commuters at every opportunity. As a result, the rider 
experience continued to suffer, which helped provide the impetus for the creation of Metro-North 
nearly two decades later. 
Though the gloom of the New Haven Line continued into the 1970s, the significance of 
Governor Rockefeller’s leadership on creating the MTA with commuter railroads in mind as part 
of a larger regional mass transportation network cannot be overstated. When the time came at 
last in 1983 to hand control over to the MTA, the transition was simple thanks to the MTA’s 
ample experience managing commuter rail by that point.57 By formally aligning commuter rail 
with more conventional forms of public transit that were already well-understood as needing 
subsidies, Rockefeller’s creation of the MTA helped save the New Haven Line from oblivion. 
Moreover, it laid the groundwork for an eventual transition of the line to full public ownership 
and operation.
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No Rest for the Weary: The Stagnant ’70s under Penn Central and 
Conrail 
With the ICC-mandated inclusion of the New Haven’s commuter lines in the newly-
merged Penn Central, talk of discontinuance temporarily abated. The Penn Central experiment 
was a colossal failure, and upon its bankruptcy in 1970 the federal government faced an even 
larger reorganization proceeding. From the ashes of Penn Central, Congress created the 
government-owned railroad Conrail in 1973 to continue freight and commuter service in the 
Northeast. The death of Penn Central also spurred Congress to create the National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) in 1971 to operate intercity passenger services, at last freeing 
the freight railroads of the burden they had complained of endlessly for the past half-century. 
The inclusion of Penn Central’s commuter lines in Conrail meant that little changed for New 
Haven Line commuters in the 1970s, except that the ever-greater drive to turn a profit meant that 
the capital investments needed to reverse the years of deferred maintenance on the New Haven 
Line were never prioritized as freight considerations continued to rule investment decisions. As a 
result, commuter service maintained its downward trajectory despite new ownership and the 
MTA subsidy arrangement. 
Penn Central Does Not Live up to Expectations (to Put It Lightly)  
On February 1, 1968, Penn Central formally began operating the trains of the former New 
Haven, New York Central, and Pennsylvania Railroads, and the railroad industry and regulators 
alike cautiously watched the new super-railroad for its anticipated $100 million in expected 
annual savings.58 The executive director of the Connecticut Transportation Authority, Samuel 
Kanell, prophetically told the New York Times that the New Haven section of the system might 
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never be profitable, but the railroad as a whole must succeed financially or else “transportation in 
this country” would not “go on as a free enterprise.”59 Instead, they witnessed the complete 
collapse of two of the nation’s most storied railroads in just over two short years. Instead of 
saving $100 million a year, Penn Central lost one million dollars a day.60 
Penn Central failed for a multitude of reasons, most of which did not have to do with its 
passenger services. Many books have been written on this subject; the failure was covered 
contemporaneously by journalists Joseph Daughen and Peter Binzen in Wreck of the Penn 
Central (1971) and revisited in impressive detail by railroad veteran-cum-history professor 
Richard Saunders, Jr. in Merging Lines (2001). Historians Robert Gallamore and John Meyer 
pointed to a litany of factors behind the failure: high labor costs, state and local taxation, 
highway competition, ICC regulation, continued mandatory absorption of passenger service 
losses, and managerial greed and “diseconomies of scale.”61 Even though planning for the 
merger stretched back to 1957, the three merged railroads did a poor job coordinating operations. 
Shippers would send loaded cars from their plants only to have them return full of the same 
goods several weeks later.62 The NYC and PRR computer systems, which the railroads bought 
after they had decided to merge, were incompatible, and auditors noted that patrons of the 
railroad were frequently not billed for service as a result.63 
Despite the numerous failures of Penn Central, the most public criticism was reserved for 
its passenger service, as a quarter-million daily commuters to Philadelphia, New York, and 
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Boston suffered rides on often-filthy cars up to 60 years old. Penn Central acknowledged the 
further decline of passenger service but argued that its heavy deficits made adequate 
maintenance impossible.64 The states made some highly-publicized improvement efforts through 
their capital programs for the line, such as the highly-publicized delivery of 144 new M2 railcars 
in 1973 to replace the pre-World War II cars that made up two-thirds of the New Haven Line 
fleet as late as 1968.65 Yet these efforts did little to address chronic delays and overall poor 
service by Penn Central; in a cruel twist, commuters trapped in a tunnel under Park Avenue due 
to a third-rail malfunction watched the first of the new M2 cars, carrying Governor Rockefeller 
and other officials, roll by on its way to Grand Central Terminal on April 17, 1973. Even the new 
train, with its VIP cargo, was twelve minutes late.66 
Amtrak: Passenger Panacea? 
The Penn Central debacle brought about the creation of Amtrak to relieve the freight 
railroads of the burden of operating intercity passenger rail service. President Nixon’s Secretary 
of Transportation, John Volpe, prepared a plan for rail passenger service that Congress 
enthusiastically adopted in 1970. Despite the national decline of intercity train travel, many 
members of Congress believed in the necessity of government preservation of a basic national 
passenger railroad network.67 Amtrak garnered bipartisan support for its market-based provisions 
which avoided direct subsidy while preventing the complete abandonment of a well-liked 
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alternative to intercity air, bus, and car travel.68 The profit-minded idealism of the Amtrak 
legislation belied a fundamental problem with the system that has persisted to this day: 
Congressional representatives, beholden to their constituents, have consistently required Amtrak 
to maintain its loss-inducing long-distance trains while attempting to turn a profit.69 
Nevertheless, the basic premise of Amtrak was that it could reverse decades of declining 
passenger service through a focus on providing for passengers as its primary customers.70 The 
establishment of Amtrak set a precedent for public sector management as a path to an improved 
rider experience that would resurface in the promises of Metro-North’s management a decade 
later. 
The creation of Amtrak brought to light the awkward position of commuter rail in a 
neglected middle ground between urban mass transit and interstate, national transportation 
services. Amtrak did not take on the commuter services operated by Penn Central in cities along 
the Northeast Corridor. Commuter rail service was instead left with Penn Central as it waded 
through bankruptcy proceedings and the federal government pondered how to handle the 
Northeast railroad fiasco in a lasting manner. Amtrak was available to operate commuter services 
under contract with local commuter authorities like the MTA, but its intended focus was 
national, interstate service rather than all-encompassing management of all domestic train routes. 
Even though commuter trains often served multiple states (as in the case of the New Haven Line) 
and were of clear import for the functioning economies of the nation’s largest cities, the federal 
government had no interest in managing them. The cities these trains served were left out of the 
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picture for the same reason, and instead states were forced to subsidize service and enter into 
compacts when necessary to coordinate multi-state funding. 
Although the railroad’s bankruptcy prompted the states served by Penn Central’s 
commuter services to take further steps toward full ownership, the states remained content to 
continue to contract out operations due to the additional budgetary and bureaucratic burden of 
ownership and the difficulty of coordinating interstate funding and management. The federal 
demonstration grant had expired in 1968, so in 1969 the two states enacted the Connecticut–New 
York Passenger Compact that formalized a continuing program of subsidy and provided for the 
states to acquire related assets from the railroad.71 The Penn Central bankruptcy provided an 
opportunity for the states to take a major step toward public ownership: in 1970, they concluded 
a Service Agreement with the railroad wherein the MTA bought and the CDOT leased trackage 
and associated properties along the New Haven Line.72 The MTA heralded this achievement as 
the end to “years of intensive efforts by both states to develop the means to improve the ailing 
line” and specifically celebrated a special note it had put out to riders in collaboration with the 
CDOT on the day of the takeover that signaled, “We know what you've been going through. 
Help is on the way.”73 
Despite this optimistic language, the states did not elect to assume full control of the line 
from Penn Central, likely due in part to the difficulties of coordinating continued Penn Central 
freight service and Amtrak intercity service.74 Even so, the two states had achieved the third 
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major step in the two-decade progression towards public ownership on the New Haven Line: in 
addition to contractual control over standards of service through the MTA, the states now held 
physical title to the infrastructure that had been allowed to deteriorate badly up to that point. 
State ownership of the New Haven Line laid the groundwork for publicly-funded upgrades to the 
railroad’s physical plant in the name of commuter passenger service.75 Though ownership of the 
infrastructure undoubtedly represented progress, New York and Connecticut’s continuing 
unwillingness to fully take over commuter operations spelled out further woes for daily 
commuters as they were handed off from one unforgiving freight railroad to another in the 
replacement of Penn Central with Conrail in 1976. 
Uncle Sam Steps In: The Coming of Conrail 
The failure of Penn Central made clear that more drastic steps were needed to address the 
Northeast rail service problem. The creation of Amtrak had done little to reverse the fortunes of 
the now-bankrupt Penn Central, despite years of protestations from the railroads that passenger 
services constituted the source of all their losses. A one-day strike by Penn Central employees in 
February 1973 spurred Congress into action to come up with a new approach for railroad service 
in the region.76 Yet the Nixon administration had no interest in pursuing a full European-style 
nationalization, which would symbolically mark a defeat for capitalism.77 The other option, 
liquidation, was rejected out-of-hand; shutting down Penn Central would affect nearly half the 
United States’ factories and cause an estimated 2.7% decline in the gross national product.78 
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Defense concerns also played a role in the government’s unwillingness to consign Penn Central 
to death by market forces.79 Truck transportation was inherently less fuel efficient, and 
America’s petroleum was supplied in large part by unpredictable foreign nations.80 Congress 
sought to find a middle ground between the extremes of nationalization and liquidation, much as 
it had for Amtrak. 
The result was the Regional Rail Reorganization (3R) Act, passed in December 1973, 
which called for the creation of a private corporation owned by the United States, like Amtrak. 
Conrail would receive funds from the federal government to build a pared-down, core freight 
network for the Northeast that would eventually become financially self-sustaining. It was an 
ambitious goal, and the 3R Act provided for the creation of the United States Railway 
Association (USRA) to study several options and from these prepare a plan for such a network.81 
Notably, the 3R Act included in its findings an explicit articulation by the legislature of the 
advantages of rail transportation, with particular attention to environmental considerations, 
which were and are still relevant to both passenger and freight service: 
Rail service and rail transportation offer economic and environmental advantages 
with respect to land use, air pollution, noise levels, energy efficiency and 
conservation, resource allocation, safety, and cost per ton-mile of movement to 
such extent that the preservation and maintenance of adequate and efficient rail 
service is in the national interest.82 
This finding expanded the government’s interest in continued rail service beyond the prevailing 
economic considerations to include environmentalist concerns such as pollution and land use. 
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The mention of land use especially affirmed the motivations of the state and local governments 
(such as New York and Connecticut) that had begun to reject highways in favor of railroads for 
the management of urban commuting. 
In a House of Representatives hearing on the USRA’s Final System Plan for Conrail in 
1975, the new railroad’s commuter service obligation was one of the primary topics the 
committee members discussed. Arthur Lewis, Chairman of the USRA, expressed his belief that 
Amtrak and commuter service authorities were inadequately compensating Conrail’s predecessor 
railroads for their passenger operations, and feared that this deficit would cause Conrail losses in 
excess of $1.65 billion in the next decade and prevent its freight services from achieving 
profitability for the railroad if not addressed.83 The USRA noted that the state legislatures 
responsible for appropriating funds to cover commuter service costs frequently underspent in this 
area, forcing Conrail’s predecessors to pick up the difference as losses; however, it singled out 
Penn Central’s contracts with the MTA and CDOT as examples of adequately compensatory 
arrangements.84 
Conrail’s Chairman and CEO, Edward Jordan, highlighted the Final System Plan’s 
recommendation that Amtrak and the commuter agencies take over routes primarily dedicated to 
passenger service, implying that the Northeast Corridor route (including the New Haven Line) 
was increasingly irrelevant for freight movements and could soon sustain direct operation by 
Amtrak and local authorities..85 The Preliminary System Plan had further advocated that “to 
minimize freight–passenger conflict, Conrail through-freight service should be moved, insofar as 
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possible, to a separate right-of-way.”86 New York and Connecticut had stopped short of fully 
acquiring the New Haven Line’s commuter operations in 1971 due to the ease of contracting 
with Penn Central, but now Conrail formally requested that the states completely relieve it of this 
obligation.  
The hearing reveals that even before it entered revenue service, Conrail’s top leadership 
expressed concerns that including commuter operations would hinder the freight railroad from 
achieving its profitability objective and encouraged their takeover by local authorities. At the 
same time, they acknowledged that the subsidies paid for the New Haven Line were sufficient. 
Lewis and Jordan’s comments foreshadowed the continued neglect of commuter service under 
Conrail as it strove, under Congressional mandate, to improve freight operations to the point of 
turning a profit. Their comments also outlined many of the arguments Conrail would make to a 
more sympathetic Reagan administration in the early 1980s. 
Conrail was formally inaugurated on April 1, 1976 to take over from Penn Central and a 
number of other regional railroads after Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform (4R) Act to implement the USRA’s Final System Plan. Signing the 4R Act 
into law, President Ford optimistically commented that “we expect that within five years Conrail 
will overcome the unprofitable legacy of the bankrupt lines,” in an eerie echo of the false 
optimism that surrounded the Penn–Central merger eight years before.87 Commuter service was 
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little mentioned in both the 3R and 4R acts, indicating federal unwillingness to address the 
thorny problems it posed. 
As commuters would soon find out, their practical omission from the legislation was 
reflected in their experience on the railroad. After seven years of deteriorating service from Penn 
Central and decades of neglect from the New Haven, the transition to Conrail on April Fool’s 
Day, 1976, “changed little except train crew hat badges;” they would now be subject to the 
vicissitudes of yet another freight carrier actively trying to rid itself of the very passenger trains 
they relied on to get to and from work every day.88 
Conrail Quality: Last Straws for the MTA 
Under Conrail, commuter service on the New Haven Line continued to deteriorate. Yet it 
would be the action of Conrail executives coupled with the permission of the federal government 
alongside agitation from disgruntled commuters, rather than initiative on the part of the MTA or 
CDOT, that would finally spark the last steps toward public ownership that resulted in the 
creation of Metro-North in 1983. 
Conrail’s “Metropolitan Region” service—a continuation of Penn Central’s commuter 
operations on the New Haven Line as well as the former New York Central Harlem and Hudson 
Lines to the west—quickly garnered the same unfavorable press from its riders as its 
predecessors had. A New York Times article from 1979 characterized on-time performance as 
“erratic,” with “frequent breakdowns in air conditioning, improper lighting, and shortened 
trains.”89 Commuter action groups like the Permanent Citizens’ Advisory Committee (PCAC) to 
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the MTA noted that despite its service contract with Conrail, the MTA did not assess penalties 
for poor service. The problems with Penn Central had carried over to Conrail, as the states 
blamed the railroad for poor service while the railroad washed its hands of responsibility by 
pleading a lack of funding. The Times article also mentions a suggestion from “some 
commuters” that the MTA take over the railroad, to which the MTA Executive Director, John 
Simpson, responded only softly, suggesting that the idea be “explored” but distancing himself 
from a direct endorsement.90  
The persistence of Conrail’s problems despite the MTA’s various stopgap measures 
revealed the fundamental ineffectiveness of the subsidy scheme and laid out the case for the 
MTA to take over the line. In 1980, it came time to renew the service contract with Conrail. 
Commuters’ suggestion of an MTA takeover was once again considered as the contract 
renegotiations neared, but it was again jettisoned in favor of the status quo. The PCAC continued 
to sound warnings about the dire state of Conrail service, with its chairman emphasizing that 
“every single performance indicator dropped significantly over the past year.”91 
Conrail’s good-faith effort to improve service with new management proved fruitless and 
further affirmed the need for new ownership. In August 1980, after a summer of broken air 
conditioning and delayed trains, Conrail named a new general manager for its Metropolitan 
Region: Joseph Spreng was a Penn Central veteran who claimed to grasp that commuter 
railroading was “50 percent public relations.” Accordingly, he ordered all Conrail supervisors to 
ride two Conrail trains a day for his first month on the job.92 Despite Spreng’s strong credentials, 
he too betrayed the all-too-familiar disdain for commuters, whom he called “gutter urchins when 
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they get upset.”93 That the MTA, under the new leadership of Richard Ravitch, had not been 
informed beforehand of Spreng’s appointment indicated the degree of disconnect it held with 
Conrail despite their professed shared goal of improved service.94 
By the end of 1980, Conrail had neither made the profits wished for by optimistic 
members of Congress, nor had it reversed the fortunes of New York’s commuter rail lines. As 
such, change was afoot as both the federal government and New York and Connecticut sought 
alternatives to the status quo. The historic Staggers Rail Act, passed in October 1980, opened the 
door for the substantial deregulation of the railroads and the end of the iron grip of the ICC; 
Conrail’s inability to turn a profit had at last helped members of Congress see the burdens of ICC 
rate controls on railroads as they struggled to compete with other transportation modes despite 
their natural advantages for freight service.95 
Meanwhile Spreng, despite his early optimism, had declared the New Haven Line in 
“crisis” by December and called (like countless others before and after) for additional state funds 
toward modernization.96 New York State began the motions of seeking alternative options to 
Conrail service, including the possibility of spinning off the LIRR and the Conrail commuter 
lines into a unified commuter agency separate from the MTA (which was viewed as bloated).97 
These actions were long overdue; the poor state of service had been well-known since the 1960s 
and New York had experienced success operating the LIRR directly. I attribute New York and 
                                                 
93 David A. Andelman, “Conrail’s Chief Orders Supervisors To Ride 2 Commuter Trains a Day,” New York Times, 
August 19, 1980. 
94 David A. Andelman, “Conrail Names New Chief For Troubled Lines Here,” New York Times, August 16, 1980. 
Ravitch was a real estate developer who had made a name for himself heading New York State’s Urban 
Development Corporation. 
95 L. Stanley Crane, Rise from the Wreckage: A Brief History of Conrail (New York: Newcomen Society of the 
United States, 1988), 16–9. 
96 Diane Henry, “Conrail’s Chief Gloomy on Plan To Improve Line: New Haven’s Modernizing 3 Years behind 
Schedule,” New York Times, December 3, 1980. 
97 Irvin Molotsky, “State Considers A New Agency For 2 Rail Lines,” New York Times, November 25, 1980. 
 39 
Connecticut’s failure to take the New Haven Line over earlier to the difficulties of coordinating 
interstate service and subsidy, bureaucratic predisposition towards the status quo, and 
unwillingness to spend additional funds to properly operate and rehabilitate the line. Fortunately, 
the MTA’s hand would shortly be forced by the new presidential administration: Ronald Reagan, 
elected in November 1980, took aim at large government programs. Conrail was a soft target, 
and the period from 1981 to 1983 would result in the creation of Metro-North as American 
freight and passenger rail service at long last became completely separated.
 41 
New Beginnings: Metro-North Takes the Reins 
The creation of Metro-North was federally initiated. The Reagan administration forced 
Conrail to accelerate its return to the private sector or face liquidation, and Conrail turned to 
Congress to request that it at last be relieved of the burden of providing commuter services. 
Despite decades of rider complaints, New York and Connecticut had never initiated a plan to 
fully take over the New Haven Line. There is no particular reason that this step could not have 
been taken years earlier than 1983. Metro-North did not receive increased subsidies upon its 
creation nor did the transition require some exceedingly large capital outlay.98 In fact, the 
transition to Metro-North operation was almost exclusively a management shift, and yet it 
produced a profound turnaround in the next ten years for commuters, who had not received good 
service since the Second World War. That remarkable improvement, then, is attributable to the 
hard work of Metro-North’s new officers to strike a better deal with labor, change the culture of 
the organization, and renegotiate subsidies with New York and Connecticut. By the mid-1990s, 
Metro-North was a poster child for the accomplishments that a public agency could make in 
improving service where the private sector, even with copious subsidy, had failed. 
Conrail Refresh in 1981 Jettisons Commuter Services 
The original intention of Conrail was to pour government dollars into a rehabilitation of a 
pared-down version of the Northeast freight rail system so that it could return to profitability and 
become private again. As the Reagan administration took power in 1981, Conrail had spent $3 
billion in federal aid without profits to show for it, and fears swirled again over the fate of the 
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railroad industry as a whole.99 Despite impressive improvements in the state of its fixed plant, 
ICC regulations had still limited the railroad in its ability to compete, and its unions continued to 
enforce inefficient work rules that resulted in the railroad spending a far higher portion of its 
operating budget on labor than its industry peers.100 
Conrail’s first president, Edward Jordan, who retired at the end of 1980, was replaced 
with L. Stanley Crane, who was instrumental in bringing Conrail to profitability.101 Crane 
believed that the deregulation of the Staggers Act, allowing further honing of the railroad’s 
sprawling network, along with further negotiation with labor, could allow the railroad to achieve 
its original goal in a few more years. Reagan administrators, particularly Secretary of 
Transportation Drew Lewis and Federal Railroad Administrator Robert Blanchette, were 
skeptical of this argument and sought to dismantle Conrail over Crane’s protestations, selling its 
lines off piecemeal.102 
Congress was more optimistic, and in a compromise with the administration passed the 
Northeast Rail Service Act (NERSA) of 1981. This key piece of legislation set up a profitability 
test as advocated by Crane. The bill allowed Crane to keep the railroad intact for an eventual 
return to the private sector if he could realize the return to the black as he promised by 1983.103 
To facilitate the turnaround, NERSA included a provision relieving Conrail of its commuter 
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service obligations, effective January 1, 1983.104 Crane reflected in retrospect that “Conrail's 
responsibility for commuter service, on which we'd lost upwards of $250 million in five years, 
was one thing that clearly had to go,” and Lewis and Blanchette were more than happy to 
devolve government services to the states where possible.105 Conrail’s story would quickly 
become one of success: Crane managed to post the company’s first-ever profit in 1981, and the 
railroad returned to the private sector as promised in 1987, with a huge initial public offering that 
netted $1.65 billion. Could the shakeup of NERSA have a similar effect on the New Haven Line? 
Ravitch Sets the Stage, 1981–1983 
On the MTA side of things, chairman Richard Ravitch negotiated the Congressionally-
mandated handover by demanding additional funds and appointing experienced commuter rail 
leadership to manage the transition away from Conrail. Ravitch described the MTA’s assumption 
of the Conrail commuter lines as an “unsought opportunity” presented to him over lunch by 
Drew Lewis; in other words, the MTA (or Ravitch, at least) had not seriously considered the 
prospect of taking over the lines, despite agitation from commuter groups tired of being subject 
to the whims of larger railroads.106 Lewis’s “opportunity” was of course less a suggestion and 
more a warning. Regardless, it set the wheels in motion for the MTA to take over the lines. 
Ravitch’s first step was to assemble a team to manage the transition. To this end, he 
brought in Peter Stangl, who was Assistant Commissioner of Public Transportation for New 
Jersey, to lead the group, along with Howard Permut, a transit executive from Chicago, and 
Donald Nelson, an experienced northeast railroader, among a few others.107 Stangl had 
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recommended the creation of New Jersey Transit to take over from the bankrupt railroads and 
bus companies that served commuters in that state. One of his first recommendations to Ravitch 
was that the MTA operate the Conrail lines directly, as opposed to contracting out operation to 
Amtrak or another private entity.108 Stangl figured that the MTA would be held accountable for 
the railroad’s performance regardless, and, given the precedent set by its longstanding operation 
of the LIRR, it would make sense to bring the northern lines in-house as well.109 Stangl was also 
keenly aware of Amtrak’s shortcomings: in his view Amtrak was inadequately funded by the 
federal government, which prevented it from attracting the best management, and it also had an 
interest in providing high-speed intercity service along the Northeast Corridor that could run 
counter to prioritizing commuter operations.110 
Fearful of the additional costs of a transition to MTA ownership, Ravitch pressed 
Congress to provide funding to ensure that the MTA would not incur additional debt in taking 
over the railroad. He testified that the MTA and CDOT would need an additional $70 million to 
prevent fare increases attached to the takeover, and firmly stated that “It would be irresponsible 
for us to undertake operation of these lines in the absence of appropriate funding and we do not 
intend to do so.”111 Ravitch also requested unsuccessfully that Congress allow the MTA to place 
its future railroad employees under state labor protections rather than federal protections, which 
had cost Conrail large sums. Like Stangl, Ravitch shot down the argument that the MTA could 
avoid the costs of transition by opting for Amtrak, since Amtrak’s burdensome labor agreements 
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and low prospects for attracting top-shelf management made it highly unlikely to provide good 
service.112 
The new Metro-North Commuter Railroad was inaugurated on New Year’s Day, 1983, 
with Peter Stangl as its first president. Ravitch’s activism before Congress had won the MTA 
funding from the federal government to defray the costs of transition.113 Stangl emphasized the 
commuter-as-customer focus of the new railroad. In a flyer distributed to riders, he 
acknowledged that “Metro-North has no magic wand to undo the years of financial neglect that 
have left their mark on the quality of service you experience daily,” but promised that it was a 
“challenge that those of us at Metro-North welcome and to which we are committed.”114 Despite 
the lack of ceremony—other than a visit by Stangl and his wife to Grand Central Terminal at 
midnight to quietly mark the switch—the change was momentous: in the coming decades, 
Metro-North would double its ridership with remarkable service improvements.115 The creation 
of the new railroad provided an opportunity for Metro-North’s management to renegotiate labor 
rules and subsidies, gaining it a stable financial footing as the railroad undertook the project of 
reversing decades of neglect. 
Labor Rules Clash Halts the “Subway North” 
On March 7, 1983, just two months after Metro-North came into being, its workforce 
went on strike, forcing 90,000 daily riders on the Harlem, Hudson, and New Haven Lines to 
struggle to find alternate ways to work. New Jersey Transit (NJT) had just experienced the start 
of a similar strike; NJT had attempted to cut pay for mid-day idle time while Metro-North sought 
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unilateral control over train crew sizes in an effort to cut jobs (union work rules required as many 
as three trainmen—not counting the conductor—on commuter trains, even though only one was 
needed to operate the train).116 Commuters interviewed were generally sympathetic to the 
MTA’s demands, and the New York Times editorial page endorsed Ravitch’s attempt at 
“shedding expensive customs and inexpensive habits.”117 
The strike illustrated just what life might have been like had the New Haven succeeded in 
dissolving commuter operations. Even with a large number of commuters taking buses provided 
by the MTA and CDOT and some opting to stay home, New York’s northern highways were 
immediately “clogged” with “bumper-to-bumper traffic,” and trip times doubled in length.118 
Five weeks into the strike, the New York Times doubled down on its position, asking, “Does 
anyone believe that a few hundred conductors have the right to damage the city’s economy, 
inconvenience 90,000 commuters and put thousands of fellow rail employees out of work for no 
good reason?”119 
The Metro-North strike ended on April 16, when the union agreed to enter binding 
arbitration with the railroad. In August, the arbitrators gave Metro-North additional power to 
determine train crew sizes while reserving consultation rights to the union; the settlement was 
mutually agreeable to both parties.120 Stangl noted that while Metro-North did not get all the 
work rule changes it wanted, its management felt it had received enough concessions to justify 
the strike.121 In retrospect, the degree to which the MTA resolved the strike to its advantage is 
much less clear. As the trains began rolling again, Ravitch revealed that he hoped to replace train 
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conductors with a futuristic, magnetic stripe-based automatic fare collection system (a union 
negotiator pejoratively declared Ravitch’s plan the “subway north”).122 Yet to this day, Metro-
North continues to employ conductors to collect fares despite multiple attempts at implementing 
such a system (and widespread phasing-out of commuter rail conductors across the globe in 
favor of automatic payment). Though Metro-North may not have achieved the full victory over 
labor it had sought, its hardline approach demonstrated to the public a strong desire among the 
new leadership to streamline inefficiencies in the name of improving service. 
Renegotiating Subsidies: Arbitrators Demand Connecticut Pay More 
Metro-North achieved further financial stability when a new manager initiated 
renegotiation of its subsidy arrangement. It is almost impossible to imagine Conrail or Penn 
Central taking the same step in the name of its customers; they were more apt simply complain 
about their obligation to provide service to begin with. The MTA entered into voluntary 
arbitration with Connecticut in 1983 to renegotiate the subsidy split. New York and Connecticut 
had split costs for the New Haven Line evenly ever since Governors Rockefeller and Dempsey’s 
agreement in 1965. Howard Permut, a member of the original Metro-North team, had argued 
during planning for the new railroad that the 50–50 split did not reflect the fact that Connecticut 
had more passengers riding the railroad than New York and that they were generally traveling 
farther.123 The arbitration was not resolved until June 1985, when Connecticut was ordered to 
assume 56.29% of the total operating deficit under the so-called Amended and Restated Service 
Agreement (ARSA).124 
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The question of equitable subsidy would continue to nag Metro-North. In 1995, the states 
entered arbitration again, which this time further increased Connecticut’s share of the deficit to 
65%.125 A Connecticut Department of Transportation report analyzing the ARSA characterized 
the MTA’s leadership role in operating Metro-North service as the origins of the inequality 
between the two states, noting that before 1983 CDOT and MTA, “on more or less equal footing, 
dealt with an independent third party that ostensibly favored neither subsidizer.”126 Connecticut’s 
gloss on this issue served to explain the increasingly inadequate funding the state had been 
giving Metro-North; from the late 1990s through the 2000s, Connecticut seriously “disinvested” 
in the New Haven Line.127 
Metro-North at Ten: Reflecting on a Remarkable Turnaround 
In 1993, Metro-North was almost unrecognizable from its condition ten years earlier. Its 
management boasted extraordinarily high performance metrics on a railroad formerly known for 
such stories as “the time the 4:08 arrived at 8:04.”128 The darling subject of such articles as “How 
Metro-North Did It: From Faltering to First-Rate in a Decade,” Metro-North had improved its 
on-time performance from 80.5% to 96%, reduced costs (as measured by the percentage of the 
budget made up by fare revenues) from 63.2% to 47.3%, and lifted ridership by 17%.129 By most 
accounts, Peter Stangl’s businesslike approach to treat commuters as “customers” had worked. 
The states’ capital programs had at last allowed the railroad to reach a level footing after years of 
deferred maintenance, labor had backed off its most arcane work rules, and the inclusion of the 
railroad in the MTA gave citizens and legislatures alike a greater sense of ownership in and 
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responsibility for the line. Undoubtedly, public ownership of the railroad contributed 
significantly to this success, even if the push that led to the MTA’s takeover came not from 
Albany or Hartford but from Capitol Hill and the White House. Subsidies and serious capital 
programs had failed to turn around deteriorating service on the New Haven Line for the two 
decades prior to 1983 as it was shuffled between three freight railroads equally uninterested in its 
success; it was not until the MTA assumed control of the line that its commuters’ fortunes 
changed—rapidly—for the better.  
 51 
Conclusion: Metro-North in the 21st Century and Beyond 
Up until the 2010s, Metro-North’s upward trajectory continued, albeit on a gradual slope. 
By its thirtieth anniversary, the railroad had fully doubled its ridership since inception, and in 
2011 Metro-North became the first American railroad to win the Brunel Award for Overall 
Excellence in Railroad Design.130 
Age has revealed some of the cracks in the railroad’s formula. Connecticut and New 
York remain antagonistic about relative subsidy levels. The railroad has yet to implement basic 
upgrades like an automated fare collection system.131 Despite extensive capital investments, the 
fastest ride times over the length of the New Haven Line are two minutes slower today than they 
were on the eve of the First World War.132 A 2013 crash in Fairfield injured 65 and exposed 
inadequacies in Metro-North’s track inspection procedures.133 
One current Metro-North project merits mention in closing; it highlights some of the 
agency’s strengths and pitfalls. Penn Station Access is a proposal dating as far back as 1999 for 
Metro-North to build stations in the Bronx along the so-called Hell Gate Line, Amtrak’s route 
between Penn Station and the New Haven Line, which it meets at New Rochelle.134 Penn Station 
Access would drastically improve transit service for this area of the East Bronx, halving the 
Manhattan commute time for more than 100,000 residents. The expansion would also give 
Metro-North more flexibility in routing trains and would dovetail with the MTA’s East Side 
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Access project to bring LIRR trains to Grand Central Terminal. Twenty years later, the $1 billion 
Penn Station Access project has at last been approved, as Amtrak and Metro-North resolved a 
months-long fight over access to the rail line, which Amtrak owns.135 
Penn Station Access illustrates the best and worst of Metro-North. As a public agency, 
Metro-North is devoted to improving transportation access for all, including some lower- and 
middle-income Bronx residents, rather than simply serving the wealthy suburban white-collar 
workers living in Westchester and Fairfield counties. The Penn Station Access project is also 
demonstrative of a desire on the part of Metro-North to improve the customer experience, by 
expanding service on the New Haven Line to enable service to both Manhattan’s East and West 
Sides. However, the delays on the project are indicative of the continued de-prioritization and 
underfunding of transit in the United States, even in a city as transit-rich as New York. Amtrak’s 
bickering with Metro-North evinces the curious place of commuter rail in many American 
metropolises, particularly in the Northeast. While Metro-North is operated as part of a 
metropolitan transit agency, it must battle with Amtrak for priority on shared lines, and the two 
endlessly point to each other for under-investing in the infrastructure. The situation on the New 
Haven Line is further complicated by its bi-state nature; even Metro-North itself is continually 
underfunded due to perennial infighting.136 
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The foresight of Governor Rockefeller saved the New Haven Line—and saved New York 
City from further destruction for automobile facilities—in the 1960s, just in time for the nascent 
environmental movement and the energy crises to give Americans another reason not to drive to 
and from work each day. As a gradual process of public acquisition and increasing subsidy 
culminated in the formation of Metro-North in 1983, commuting by rail became desirable again 
for residents of New York and Connecticut living near the New Haven Line. Recognizing 
commuter rail for the public transit that it is—a common good deserving of government subsidy 
in exchange for wide-ranging economic and quality-of-life benefits—set the New Haven Line up 





1848 New York & New Haven railroad is completed. 
1949 Long Island Railroad (LIRR) enters receivership (bankruptcy), operation is subsidized by 
the State of New York. 
1961 New Haven Railroad enters receivership; Interstate Commerce Commission mandates 
that it continue operating passenger services. 
1965 New York State buys out the LIRR from the Pennsylvania Railroad and establishes the 
Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA) to operate it. New York and 
Connecticut jointly subsidize the New Haven Line’s commuter operations in equal 
shares. 
1968 MCTA merges with the New York City Transit Authority, which operated buses and 
subways, and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority to form the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (MTA). The MTA also begins to oversee commuter rail 
operation north of the city on the New Haven Line and the New York Central Railroad. 
1968 The New Haven, New York Central, and Pennsylvania Railroads are merged into the new 
Penn Central system, which takes over operating the New Haven’s passenger services the 
next year. 
1970 Penn Central declares bankruptcy; the federal government scrambles to deal with what 
was then the largest bankruptcy in American history. 
1971 The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), formed by Congress the year 
prior to relieve railroads of unprofitable passenger operations, takes over all U.S. intercity 
passenger rail traffic. The MTA buys and the Connecticut Department of Transportation 
leases their respective portions of the New Haven Line from Penn Central. 
1973 Congress passes the Rail Reorganization (3R) Act, which creates the United States 
Railway Association (USRA) to develop a plan to preserve rail service (which Congress 
still viewed as vital to industry) in the Northeast. 
1976 Congress passes the Rail Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act, which 
implements the USRA’s plan for a new, government-owned Northeast rail carrier—the 
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail)—to take over the freight and commuter services 
of the former Penn Central and achieve financial self-sufficiency. Commuter services 
were to be fully subsidized by the relevant regional commuter transportation authorities. 
1981 The Reagan Administration targets Conrail, which had yet to turn a profit, as an 
unacceptably expensive government service and seeks its liquidation. Congress passes 
the Northeast Rail Service Act, which creates a profitability test for Conrail and allows it 
to transfer commuter operations (which were a clear money-loser) to local authorities. 
1983 The newly-formed Metro-North Railroad, a division of the MTA, begins operating 
commuter service on the New Haven and former New York Central lines. After a 
crippling six-week strike, the railroad began continuous operation in April. 
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1985 An arbitration panel increases Connecticut’s share of funding for the line from 50 to 
60%. Connecticut buys its portion of the New Haven Line from the Penn Central trustees, 




Writing my essay about the Metro-North has posed several sourcing challenges but has 
also been a highly rewarding research experience. The secondary source base for writing on 
twentieth-century U.S. railroads is rich; however, most of these books tend to focus on the 
railroad industry on the whole (with an emphasis on freight rail) or, occasionally, on passenger 
rail. I have not found a scholarly treatment of commuter railroads in particular and how they 
weathered the demise of private passenger railroading in the mid-1900s. 
As you will know from reading my essay, the history of the mergers, bankruptcies, and 
litigation surrounding the Northeast railroads in the 1960s–80s is extraordinarily complicated, 
and several key books have helped me get a grasp on this period. These include Richard 
Saunders’s Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900–1970 (2001) and Robert Gallamore and 
John Meyer’s American Railroads: Decline and Renaissance in the Twentieth Century (2014). 
Saunders’s book gives an extraordinarily detailed window into the characters and issues that 
drove the often-fickle politicking that led to the mergers and failures of the 1960s. Both books 
provide an excellent overview of railroad regulatory history and help to draw out the longer saga 
of various attempts at nationalization and deregulation as the railroads lost their monopolistic 
edge in the twentieth century. 
To supplement the broader scholarship I mentioned above, I drew on railroad journals for 
their detailed treatment of more specific issues. These articles were well-sourced and sought to 
shed new light on particular vignettes related to my project. The journal Railroad History has 
provided some excellent articles on the specific problems of the New Haven Railroad and an in-
depth retrospective on the case of Penn Central in Geoffrey Doughty’s “What to Do with the 
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New Haven” (Fall–Winter 2013) and Robert Holzweiss’s “Penn Central Reconsidered” (Fall–
Winter 2017), respectively. Another source in this genre, and the only secondary source I could 
find that centered Metro-North, is “How Metro-North Did It: From Faltering to First Rate in a 
Decade” by William Middleton in a special edition of Passenger Train Journal entitled North 
American Commuter Rail 1994. This article provides statistics showing the rapid turnaround the 
railroad accomplished in its first ten years of operation, arguing that New York and 
Connecticut’s aggressive modernization programs and the total focus on commuters enabled the 
railroad to drastically improve service. 
Another class of sources that informed my paper were popular histories. These books, 
usually replete with railfan photographs and anecdotes, were useful for getting a clearer sense of 
the culture surrounding the railroad as well as a sort of insider view of the issues that agitate the 
many railfans who cherish the industry and know its ins and outs. Such titles as On the 8:02: An 
Informal History of Commuting by Rail in America by Lawrence Grow (1979) and Next Stop 
Grand Central: A Trip through Time on New York’s Metropolitan Area Commuter Railroads by 
Stan Fischler (1986) gave some excellent vignettes in the history of the New Haven but were 
generally frustratingly vague and informal in their sourcing. Conrail (2004), by Timothy Doherty 
and Brian Solomon, was a helpful resource for understanding that railroad’s creation and 
operational history and made the argument that although the railroad eventually split up, it was a 
success. Unfortunately, Conrail did not contain much information on its commuter services (a 
perhaps unsurprising if disappointing fact given how marginal they were in comparison to 
Conrail’s freight business). 
While the source base for commuter rail was quite limited, I found a wide range of 
supplementary reading on the history of public transportation, suburban development, and the 
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reign of the automobile that helped inform my broader thinking about the project. Sam Bass 
Warner’s seminal work on commuting patterns along streetcar lines in Boston, Streetcar 
Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900 (1969) helped motivate the project and 
explained how radial railroad lines extending from a major metropolis dictated urban and 
suburban development. Getting There: The Epic Struggle between Road and Rail in the 
American Century by Stephen Goddard (1996) was an excellent resource for comparing the 
favorable treatment given by the government to private automobiles and truckers to the 
burdensome regulation and taxation experienced by the railroads (due to legacy antitrust fears). 
Autophobia: Love and Hate in the Automobile Era by Brian Ladd (2008) helped provide 
international perspective on the U.S.’s comparative disinvestment in public transit in the mid-
20th century. 
Primary Sources 
In my project, I have encountered a rich and varied primary source base with some 
frustrating gaps. My first discovery was the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
archives at the University of Connecticut Library’s Archives and Special Collections in Storrs. 
The library has extensive holdings related to the railroad, including corporate records, 
photographs, and ephemera as well as the records of the New Haven Railroad Historical and 
Technical Association. These archives include extensive documentation of the railroad’s final 
bankruptcy in 1961 and preparation for the merger with the Pennsylvania and New York Central 
Railroads in the 1960s. Over the course of three research visits, I consulted these documents with 
the help of Laura Smith, a librarian who specializes in UConn’s railroad history collection. 
Finding material related to Conrail and Metro-North was much more difficult. I found a 
single finding aid for a Metro-North collection held by the New York City Transit museum in 
Brooklyn. Unfortunately, this collection contained only a smattering of documents from the first 
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ten years or so of Metro-North’s operation, including a handful of annual reports and capital 
improvement programs. The most useful items from this collection were ephemera including 
several issues of The Commuter, the MTA’s commuter relations pamphlet from the 1970s, and a 
1982 flyer by Peter Stangl, Metro-North’s first president, announcing the railroad’s coming 
transition as a departure from “poor and uncomfortable” Conrail service. I was also able to find 
an incomplete set of MTA annual reports from the 1970s at the Science, Industry, and Business 
Library of the New York Public Library. 
Beyond these archival visits, I found the remainder of my primary sources online or in 
print through the Yale Library and inter-library loans. Many of these sources were judiciary, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and state and congressional documents, which provided a 
first-hand look into the federal- and state-level testimony and legislative thinking during these 
periods of restructuring for the railroads. I also made extensive use of the New York Times’s 
digitized archive to examine newspaper coverage of the experience of commuters on the New 
Haven Line as well as factual details on the day-by-day progress of mergers, subsidy 
negotiations, and management changeover. 
Another set of sources I made use of were a handful of studies conducted by outside 
consultants and academics on commuting in the 1960s. These works bridged the gap between 
primary and secondary sources because they were used contemporaneously by lawmakers, 
judges, and the railroads as scientific support for their agendas, even though they frequently drew 
wildly different conclusions. Future Highways and Urban Growth, a 1961 report by New 
Haven-based Wilbur Smith and Associates centered the automobile and in the fashion of its time 
called for urban freeway construction while admitting the necessity of transit for peak-period 
trips. Commuter Transportation: A Study of Passenger Transportation in the New Jersey–New 
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York–Connecticut Metropolitan Region with Particular Reference to Railroad Commutation, a 
1961 publication prepared by the venerable Regional Plan Association of New York for the 
United States Senate, posited the necessity of commuter rail more forcefully. “The Decline of 
Railroad Commutation,” a 1962 Business History Review article by influential urban historian 
George Hilton imagined car-oriented Los Angeles as the city of the future, showing the wide 
range of responses from planners to what was known as the “urban transportation problem” 
during the height of the automobile era.  
Finally, I conducted oral interviews with four former MTA employees, which helped me 
understand many of the issues—both contemporary and past—occupying the minds of the 
railroad’s public transit management and gave me a better sense of the arc of the Metro-North’s 
now 36 years of service. These were with Lee Sander, MTA executive director from 2007 to 
2009, Howard Permut, Metro-North president from 2008 to 2014, Peter Stangl, Metro-North 
president from 1983 to 1991 and MTA chairman from 1991 to1995, and Richard Ravitch, MTA 
chairman from 1979 to 1983. Permut, Stangl, and Ravitch were part of a small group that built 
the Metro-North in the early 1980s. They provided valuable insights on the planning for Metro-
North, the varying level of cooperation between New York and Connecticut in running and 
funding the New Haven Line, and Metro-North’s experience renegotiating labor rules with its 
unions.  
Conclusion 
It was a pleasure to compile such a broad source base for this project, although it was at 
times overwhelming to try to maintain a comprehensive grasp on such a variegated and 
beleaguered history as that of commuting on the New Haven Line, even in just a three-decade 
period. The main gap in my sources lies with the MTA; it was difficult to determine why Metro-
North was not created until 1983 (beyond the action of Congress and the Reagan Administration 
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to relieve Conrail of its commuter obligations) when service on its lines had been poor for over 
two decades and the MTA had run the Long Island Railroad since 1965. 
Though the gap in secondary source coverage of the privatization of commuter 
railroading in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s was frustrating because I had to piece 
together bits of information from many sources, it was satisfying to feel like the work I produced 
brought to the foreground an under-sung but vital part of the daily life of American railroading as 
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